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The dorsomedial frontal part of the cerebral cortex is consistently activated when people
read the mental states of others, such as their beliefs, desires, and intentions, the
ability known as having a theory of mind (ToM) or mentalizing. This ubiquitous finding
has led many researchers to conclude that the dorsomedial frontal cortex (DMFC)
constitutes a core component in mentalizing networks. Despite this, it remains unclear
why the DMFC becomes active during ToM tasks. We argue that key psychological
and behavioral aspects in mentalizing are closely associated with DMFC functions.
These include executive inhibition, distinction between self and others, prediction under
uncertainty, and perception of intentions, all of which are important for predicting others’
intention and behavior. We review the literature supporting this claim, ranging in fields
from developmental psychology to human neuroimaging and macaque electrophysiology.
Because perceiving intentions in others’ actions initiates mentalizing and forms the basis
of virtually all types of social interaction, the fundamental issue in social neuroscience is
to determine the aspects of physical entities that make an observer perceive that they
are intentional beings and to clarify the neurobiological underpinnings of the perception of
intentionality in others’ actions.
Keywords: dorsomedial frontal cortex, theory of mind, mentalizing, self, others, executive function, intention,
uncertainty
INTRODUCTION
The success of human life depends on interactions with other
individuals. The social world thus constantly prompts one to
reflect upon both one’s own mental states (e.g., thoughts, inten-
tions, desires, and beliefs) and those of others. The ability to
explain and predict others’ behavior in terms of their mental
states is known as having a theory of mind (ToM) or mental-
izing (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985, 1999; Frith and Frith, 1999).
This ToM ability is the basis for many social behaviors such as
cooperation, reciprocity, empathy, and deception. Studies using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have consistently
demonstrated that the dorsomedial frontal cortex (DMFC) is a
core component in mentalizing networks (Gallagher and Frith,
2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006). In such studies, the foci of
DMFC activation can range from Brodmann area 6 (BA 6)
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), which may roughly correspond to
the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), to BAs 8 and
9 (Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel et al., 1995; Happe et al., 1996;
Gallagher et al., 2000) and further anteriorly to BA 10 (Amodio
and Frith, 2006; Gilbert et al., 2006). Anatomical connections
between the pre-SMA and anteriorly adjacent areas of the fron-
tomedian wall (Luppino et al., 1993; Johansen-Berg et al., 2004;
Yeterian et al., 2012) suggest their functional integrity. In paral-
lel with fMRI findings, clinical case studies have also shown that
patients with DMFC lesions can exhibit severe ToM impairments
(Happe et al., 1999; Rowe et al., 2001; Stuss et al., 2001). These
findings collectively implicate the DMFC in ToM.
Then, why is the DMFC generally activated during ToM tasks
at all? What component processes of ToM, if any, are responsi-
ble for activating the DMFC? There has been a debate regarding
domain specificity vs. domain generality of ToM. One view posits
that ToM depends on functional modules that are specialized
for ToM computations (domain specificity) (Leslie and Thaiss,
1992; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Frith and Frith, 2003; Saxe et al.,
2004). The other view claims that ToM can be accounted for by
the integration of multiple functional modules, each of which is
not originally specialized for social cognition (domain general-
ity) (Carlson et al., 2004; Apperly et al., 2005; Stone and Gerrans,
2006). One confounding factor that might make this issue con-
troversial is the inclusion of any material in cognitive tasks that,
by itself, activates mentalizing processes (Van Overwalle, 2011).
Indeed, even abstract shapes that move in a biologically plausi-
ble manner, verbal stories or cartoons that involve goal-directed
actions, or traits that are suggestive of social beings can all auto-
matically recruit the ToM network (Van Overwalle and Baetens,
2009). However, our goal is not in the in-depth discussion on such
an intractable debate; the issue is beyond the scope of this study.
Instead, the goal of this article is to address potential relation-
ships between theDMFC and several processes thatmay be closely
associated with ToM. In particular, we will illuminate executive
inhibition, self-other distinction, prediction under uncertainty,
and perception of intentions, and discuss how the DMFC partic-
ipates in each of these processes. What the four processes have in
common is twofold. First, they are all associated with the process
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of predicting others’ intention, a crucial aspect of ToM for under-
standing and anticipating others’ behavior (see below). Second, it
is becoming technically feasible to investigate their cellular mech-
anisms using the single-neuron recording method in non-human
primate platforms. Thus, our intention is to incorporate recent
progress on the cellular basis for predicting others’ intention into
the dominant literature in developmental psychology and human
neuroimaging. We believe that the functional imaging technique
and single-neuron recording technique will complement each
other to uncover the cellular and network mechanisms of ToM.
Note that our position does not immediately support domain
generality of ToM. As will be discussed later, viewing a physical
entity as an intentional being might be a mental process that is
uniquely social. This mental process may be deeply related to an
indeterministic bias or moral responsibility that people typically
attribute to social agents, but not to non-social objects (Nichols,
2011).
In what follows, we review the experimental findings from
different disciplines, in particular, developmental psychology,
clinical neuropsychology, human neuroimaging, and electrophys-
iological recording in monkeys. Although monkeys may not
mentalize as humans do, they possess related skills. Monkeys can
actively monitor a conspecific’s actions and their outcomes for
planning their own actions (Yoshida et al., 2011, 2012; Chang
et al., 2013). They can make inferences about what others can see
(Flombaum and Santos, 2005). Supporting this view, the DMFC
of humans and monkeys, including areas associated with ToM,
has functional organization that shares similar patterns of cou-
pling between each DMFC subregion and the rest of the brain
(Sallet et al., 2013). There has been no evidence for “new” regions
in the human DMFC (Sallet et al., 2013). Moreover, the increased
complexity of monkeys’ social environments is accompanied by
an increase in the volume of the gray matter in the DMFC (Sallet
et al., 2011). These findings suggest that the DMFC plays an
important role in social cognition in monkeys as well.
EXECUTIVE INHIBITION
The construct of executive functions subsumes several processes
that allow for generating flexible thought and behavior. Executive
control includes inhibition, shifting, updating, access, working
memory, and planning (Miyake et al., 2000; Fisk and Sharp, 2004;
Baez et al., 2012) and can effectively integrate cognition and emo-
tion (Pessoa, 2008), so that organisms can guide an appropriate
decision in novel or dangerous situations while suppressing a pre-
potent, habitual action that is no longer appropriate (Shallice,
1998). Among several executive processes that are potentially
associated with ToM (Aboulafia-Brakha et al., 2011; but see Baez
et al., 2012 for an alternative view in people with autism spectrum
disorders, ASDs), executive inhibition–i.e., deliberate suppression
of immediate behavior in order to achieve a later, internally repre-
sented goal (Nigg, 2000)—has been most consistently reported to
be a crucial factor enabling the development of social competence
such as ToM (Carlson and Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2004) and
cooperation (Ciairano et al., 2007). In support of this view, exec-
utive inhibition is impaired in children with ASDs (Ozonoff et al.,
1991; Frith, 1997; Robinson et al., 2009), whose performance of
ToM tasks is severely impaired (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
The close association between executive inhibition and social
cognition, in particular ToM, is rooted in the saliency of self-
relevant information as well as people’s habitual tendency to use
themselves as the reference point in social judgments, which is
sometimes referred to as the “egocentric assumption of shared
perspectives” (Fenigstein and Abrams, 1993) or “epistemic ego-
centrism” (Royzman et al., 2003). For example, recall of self-
relevant information is better than recall of other kinds of
information (Rogers et al., 1977; Bower and Gilligan, 1979).
Self-relevant information enjoys privileged accessibility, greater
confidence, and reduced response time compared with other-
relevant information (Rogers et al., 1977; Bower and Gilligan,
1979; Kuiper and Rogers, 1979; Aron et al., 1991). Furthermore,
people tend to impute pre-potent self-perspective to others
(Moore et al., 1995; Mitchell et al., 1996; Nickerson, 1999). These
biases, however, can give rise to a potential problem of correctly
attributing a mental state to its proper agent, leading to misap-
prehensions of others’ minds. These psychological observations
have led Decety and Sommerville (2003) to argue that execu-
tive inhibition may be a necessary requisite to suppressing the
pre-potent self-perspective in favor of others’ discrepant perspec-
tive when reading the mental state of others. Consistent with this
view, children with poor executive inhibition have problems in
social relationships owing to the poor ability to recognize oth-
ers’ desires (Henker and Whalen, 1999). In older adults as well,
the reduced ability to inhibit pre-potent self-perspective is asso-
ciated with the difficulty in taking the perspective of another
(Bailey and Henry, 2008). Of interest is that a patient with dam-
age in the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) is able to infer
another’s state of mind when he himself does not hold a strongly
conflicting self-perspective (i.e., low self-perspective inhibition
demands); however, the patient performs poorly in tasks with
high self-perspective inhibition demands (Samson et al., 2005).
The rIFG has long been thought to play a role in executive inhi-
bition in non-social contexts (Konishi et al., 1998; Aron et al.,
2004; Chambers et al., 2006). Yet, evidence is now accumulating
to support the existence of shared neural substrates for inhibitory
control in complex social situations and basic motor response
inhibition (Brass et al., 2005; Samson et al., 2005; van der Meer
et al., 2011).
The DMFC constitutes another critical node subserving
inhibitory control. This was first demonstrated by Penfield and
Welch (1949) more than 60 years ago. They noted that electrical
stimulation in the human DMFC suppressed voluntary move-
ment, typically characterized by slowing, hesitation, or inability to
initiate or continue phasic motor activity without affecting con-
sciousness. Since then such “negative” motor phenomena have
been consistently reported as the inhibitory effects of stimula-
tion on motor performance (Lim et al., 1994; Luders et al., 1995;
Yazawa et al., 2000; Yamamoto et al., 2004) and as readiness
potentials preceding voluntary muscle relaxation (Terada et al.,
1995; Yazawa et al., 1998). Recently, the role of the DMFC in
executive inhibition has been characterized using more demand-
ing behavioral tasks. For example, the DMFC, particularly the
pre-SMA and nearby regions (Figure 1A), is activated when sub-
jects suppress an impending action or a cognitive set particularly
under the presence of strong response interference or in favor of
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FIGURE 1 | Involvement of DMFC in executive inhibition. (A) When the
animal successfully switched to a now-valid action by inhibiting a
pre-potent, no-longer-valid action, pre-SMA “switch neurons” fired
phasically before movement onset (red). Switching was unsuccessful when
the initiation of activity increase was delayed (blue). (B) The contrast
between inhibition vs. action trials revealed activation in the dorsal
frontomedial cortex (BA 9). Reprinted with permission from Brass and
Haggard (2007).
alternative, less-dominant options (Ullsperger and von Cramon,
2001; Garavan et al., 2003; Nachev et al., 2005; Aron et al., 2007;
Isoda and Hikosaka, 2007; Duann et al., 2009; Hikosaka and
Isoda, 2010; Konishi et al., 2010; Sharp et al., 2010; Duque et al.,
2013);. Electrical stimulation in the DMFC can inhibit the gen-
eration of eye movement, but this effect is only observed when
the stimulation is delivered after a cue is given to initiate the
movement (Isoda, 2005). Executive inhibition can be impaired in
subjects with superior DMFC damage (Floden and Stuss, 2006) or
in intact subjects with stimulation (Chen et al., 2009; Hsu et al.,
2011) applied over the same DMFC region. The inhibitory con-
trol of the DMFC may be mediated by interaction with other
cortical regions such as the rIFG and primary motor cortex,
and/or with subcortical regions such as the subthalamic nucleus
(Johansen-Berg et al., 2004; Aron et al., 2007; Taylor et al., 2007a;
Isoda and Hikosaka, 2008, 2011; Duann et al., 2009; Mars et al.,
2009; Neubert et al., 2010; Duque et al., 2013).
Executive inhibition has been typically mapped in the pre-
SMA, the rostralmost part of BA 6 within the DMFC (Van
Overwalle, 2011). Other neuroimaging studies, however, point to
the involvement of more rostral regions as well. Most of the stud-
ies outlined above have focused on inhibitory control elicited by
external stimuli. However, in daily life people very often decide
themselves whether to or not to act. Incorporating this criti-
cal aspect of inhibition in a task paradigm has revealed that the
dorsal frontomedian cortex (BA 9; Figure 1B) is involved in “self-
control” of inhibition (Brass and Haggard, 2007; Kuhn et al.,
2009). A similar brain region is also activated when participants
themselves decide to quit continued gambling to recover pre-
vious losses (loss chasing) (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2008).
Furthermore, even more rostral regions (the anterior fronto-
median cortex, BA 10/32) come into play when people inhibit
automatic tendencies to imitate others (Brass et al., 2005, 2009).
Many motor skills, language, and moral behaviors are learned via
imitation in earlier life, but adults do not generally imitate others
very often. In fact, people might become irritated when someone
else intentionally imitates them. In this light, imitation inhibition
is socially adaptive. These findings suggest that the DMFC plays
a key role in executive inhibition, with more rostral regions being
increasingly recruited as the degree of self-control or a social need
increases. Future studies should explicitly address the question
of whether the DMFC also plays a role in inhibiting pre-potent
self-perspectives.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN SELF AND OTHER
There is converging evidence from different disciplines that the
perception and execution of an action have a common rep-
resentational basis. First, it has been documented in cognitive
psychology that the observation of an action automatically primes
a corresponding motor representation in the observer. For exam-
ple, the execution of an action (e.g., index finger movement)
while observing an incongruent action (e.g., middle finger move-
ment) leads to a longer reaction time than while observing
a congruent action (Brass et al., 2009). Intriguingly, observed
environmental constraints are also automatically mapped onto
the observer’s motor system: observing another’s hands being
physically restrained leads to a longer response time (Liepelt
et al., 2009). Second, evidence from clinical neuropsychology
shows that people with frontal damage can display echopractic
responses. For example, when patients are instructed to show
their index finger upon seeing the experimenter’s fist but to
show their fist upon seeing the experimenter’s index finger,
they tend to copy the observed action (Luria, 1980). Moreover,
prefrontal patients can show strong imitative response ten-
dencies even when not instructed to do so (Lhermitte et al.,
1986). Finally, evidence from neuroscience clearly demonstrates
that common coding occurs between perception and action
at the level of single neurons in various parts of the brain
(Rizzolatti et al., 2001). These neurons, called “mirror neu-
rons” and originally found in the monkey brain, are hypoth-
esized to play a role in understanding others’ actions and
goals (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). Taken together, these findings
support the existence of mirror-matching mechanisms in the
central nervous system, whereby perceiving an action auto-
matically activates the equivalent motor representation in the
observer.
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However, people do not normally confuse others with
themselves. This is true even when the other is produced by the
imagination of the self. People are readily capable of attributing
actions to either themselves or another. The classical mirror-
matching theories are silent on how the brain carries out such
attribution. Despite ample evidence for the shared self-other rep-
resentation, there must exist a mechanism that separates self- and
other-related motor representations (Jeannerod, 1999). A previ-
ous study supports the idea that the motor system represents
other agents as qualitatively different from the self (Schutz-
Bosbach et al., 2006).
The formation of mentalizing capacity necessitates the ability
to form the representation of others’ mental states and to distin-
guish it from one’s own (Frith and Frith, 1999). As mentioned
earlier, we tend to view others as analogous to ourselves, but we
also identify them as unique. In the social world, we reflect not
only upon our own mental states, but those of others around us
as well. Moreover, such mental states must be correctly assigned
to their proper agent. This capacity may prevent self-other con-
fusion and chaotic social interactions, as is the case in people
with schizophrenia who demonstrate overextension of agency to
others’ actions or attenuation of self-agency (Decety and Grezes,
2006). In the laboratory, mentalizing capacity is evaluated most
often using false belief tasks that require distinction between one’s
own and others’ beliefs. Children with ASDs show a marked dif-
ficulty dissociating a false belief of another person from their
own true belief. It has been argued that individuals with ASDs
are strongly self-focused, which is hypothesized to arise from the
lack of distinguishing between self and another (Lee and Hobson,
2006; Mitchell and O’Keefe, 2008; Lombardo et al., 2010a). The
self-other distinction is also central to self-consciousness and
agency (Decety and Grezes, 2006).
The ability to distinguish between self and others appears to
develop throughout the infancy period (Sebastian et al., 2008;
Burnett and Husain, 2011). For example, newborn babies orient
their face toward the source of tactile stimulation more frequently
to external touch than to spontaneous self-touch to the cheek
(Hespos and Rochat, 1997). By 5–6 months of age, infants pref-
erentially view a video of another infant compared with a video
of themselves (Bahrick et al., 1996). Children start to recognize
themselves in mirrors at around 18 months (Povinelli, 1995). In
the second and third years, infants start to understand that oth-
ers are similarly self-aware and differentiate between themselves
and another in speech (Bates, 1990). These empirical observa-
tions are considered to be evidence for having neural mechanisms
that distinguish between self and others.
Accumulating evidence indicates that, unlike the mirror sys-
tem, self- and other-related processes can be segregated in the
DMFC. Neuroimaging studies have shown that self-related judg-
ments are associated with the ventral MFC (BAs 10 and 32),
whereas other-related judgments are associated with the DMFC
(BAs 8 and 9) (VanOverwalle, 2009; Denny et al., 2012). Crucially,
the z-coordinates in individual studies can predict whether the
study involves self- or other-related judgments, which are asso-
ciated with increasingly ventral or dorsal portions of the MFC,
respectively (Denny et al., 2012). Such an areal segregation
appears to depend on the perceived overlap between self and
others (in terms of sociopolitical views), as mentalizing about a
similar other engages a region of the ventral MFC that is linked
to self-referential thoughts, whereas mentalizing about a dissim-
ilar other engages a more dorsal region of the MFC (Mitchell
et al., 2006). It should also be noted, however, that Behrens
and co-workers propose another view that a functional gradi-
ent in the MFC is better tied to the relevance of valuation for
current choice (executed values vs. modeled values) than to the
frame of reference of the individual (self vs. other) (Nicolle
et al., 2012). In addition to the ventral MFC, neurotypical indi-
viduals preferentially recruit the middle cingulate cortex during
self-related processing compared with other-related processing
(Mitchell et al., 2006; Tomlin et al., 2006; Chiu et al., 2008;
Lombardo et al., 2010a). However, individuals with ASDs dis-
play the reverse or lack of the preferential response to the self
in the middle cingulate cortex (Chiu et al., 2008; Lombardo
et al., 2010a) as well as the ventral MFC (Lombardo et al.,
2010a). This atypical neural self-other distinction may mir-
ror atypical behavioral self-other distinction in ASDs (Lee and
Hobson, 2006; Mitchell and O’Keefe, 2008; Lombardo et al.,
2010a).
In the mirror system, coding of one’s own actions and oth-
ers’ actions overlaps at the level of single neurons. How then
do individual neurons in the mentalizing system, in particu-
lar the DMFC, code the two kinds of action? The ability to
mentalize might have evolved from a system for representing
actions (Frith and Frith, 1999), as action is one of the main
channels used for interpersonal communication. Determining the
agent of action may thus contribute to the differentiation of self
and others (Jeannerod, 1999). To address this issue, Isoda and
coworkers trained two monkeys sitting face-to-face to perform
a role-reversal task (Yoshida et al., 2011, 2012). In each trial,
one monkey was assigned the role of an actor and the other
an observer, and the roles alternated every two trials. During
each trial, the actor made a choice between a yellow or green
illuminated button. If the actor made the correct choice, both
monkeys received a reward. Thus, reward expectation was con-
stant across two animals in each trial, and the experimenters were
able to identify agent-specific neuronal signals. They found that
“partner-type neurons”—which fired selectively during the part-
ner’s action (Figure 2, left)—were encountered significantly more
frequently in the pre-SMA and its anterior extension including
BA 8 possibly extending into the caudal BA 9, whereas “self-
type neurons”—which fired selectively during one’s own action
(Figure 2, right)—were significantlymore prevalent inmore ven-
tral, cingulate sulcus regions including the rostral cingulate motor
area and its anterior extension (Yoshida et al., 2011). These find-
ings support the hypothesis that self-actions and others’ actions
are differentially represented in the DMFC. The findings are
also consistent with human fMRI findings showing that attribu-
tion of other-agency activates the pre-SMA and BA 8 (Sperduti
et al., 2011). An important issue to clarify in the future is the
computational operation whereby distinction between aspects of
self and others is accomplished (Blakemore et al., 2002). Very
recently, a coordinate transformation approach has been pro-
posed to account for such operations (Chang, 2013; Chang et al.,
2013).
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PREDICTION UNDER UNCERTAINTY
The mental states of others are much less predictable than those
of one’s self. This may be particularly true for distant others as
opposed to close others, and under competition as opposed to
cooperation. Unpredictability of others’ minds may be rooted
in asymmetry of information sources that people use to make
inferences about self and others. Specifically, the information
people use for themselves is largely introspective and interocep-
tive, whereas the information available to infer about others is
largely extrospective and exteroceptive (Lombardo and Baron-
Cohen, 2011). That is, one cannot directly access the sensation,
emotion, or thought of others. Instead, one’s experience of oth-
ers’ phenomenology is primarily dominated by observing their
external behaviors (Pronin, 2008). Reading others’ minds is thus
inherently an uncertain process. It is therefore possible that brain
regions processing uncertainty come into play duringmentalizing
about others.
From a deterministic viewpoint, uncertainty is always caused
by a lack of knowledge. Nevertheless, uncertainty has been opera-
tionally divided into two constructs: risk or expected uncertainty,
FIGURE 2 | Involvement of DMFC in self-other distinction. A group of
DMFC neurons (“partner-type neurons”) were preferentially activated when
the recorded monkey observed another monkey making an action (blue),
while another group of DMFC neurons (“self-type neurons”) were
preferentially activated when the recorded monkey executed an action
(red).
and ambiguity or estimation uncertainty (Knight, 1921; Payzan-
LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011; O’Reilly, 2013). Risk or expected
uncertainty refers to the type of uncertainty that derives from
stochasticity inherent in the environment, where variance deter-
mines the level of uncertainty. This type of uncertainty is what
we cannot control and is therefore attributed to external reasons
(Howell, 1971; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). In contrast, uncer-
tainty that arises from people’s insufficient knowledge is referred
to as ambiguity or estimation uncertainty. This type of uncer-
tainty is attributed to internal factors and can be reduced by
obtaining more pieces of information. It seems likely that uncer-
tainty associated with inferring others’ mental states or predicting
others’ behavior does not originate from stochasticity of the world
around us, but is due mostly to internal factors, that is, ambiguity
or estimation uncertainty. Thus, better understanding of others
requires constantly updating the current belief about them on
the basis of incoming information obtained through observation
(Behrens et al., 2008).
As can be seen in Figure 3, the DMFC is preferentially acti-
vated when subjects predict events under varying levels of uncer-
tainty based on natural sampling (Volz et al., 2003). Disregarding
the level of uncertainty, the pre-SMA, BA 8, and subcortical net-
works including the ventral striatum and ventral tegmental area
are significantly activated during prediction under uncertainty
compared with prediction under certainty. Among these regions,
BA 8 is the only region that shows activity changes that signifi-
cantly correlates with the level of uncertainty (Volz et al., 2003).
Notably, BA 8 is commonly activated regardless of whether uncer-
tainty is caused by external or internal factors (Volz et al., 2004).
Other studies also point to the activation of the frontomedian wall
(typically BAs 8 and 9) using various task paradigms involving
decision-making under ambiguity (Hsu et al., 2005; Yoshida and
Ishii, 2006) or risk (Mohr et al., 2010; Symmonds et al., 2013).
Activity in the more anterior BA 10 encodes uncertainty of infer-
ence about other people’s beliefs in a strategic game (Yoshida
et al., 2010).
Uncertainty is a key dimension of daily behavior that influ-
ences not only one’s own decisions, but also emotions such
as anxiety. The ability to tolerate uncertainty markedly differs
across individuals; some people suffer from stress, discomfort,
FIGURE 3 | Involvement of DMFC in prediction under uncertainty.
The contrast between prediction under uncertainty vs. control conditions
revealed activation in several brain regions including the frontomedian
cortex (BA 8). vST, ventral striatum; Tha, thalamus; VTA, midbrain area;
Cu, cuneus; Ce, cerebellum. Reprinted with permission from Volz et al.
(2003).
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and avoidance that uncertainty induces (Mushtaq et al., 2011;
Grupe and Nitschke, 2013). Affective appraisal of ambiguous
faces is associated with activation in networks including the
DMFC (Simmons et al., 2006). Moreover, the activation of mesial
BA 8 negatively correlates with the degree to which subjects can-
not tolerate uncertainty (“intolerance of uncertainty”) (Schienle
et al., 2010). Because activation in this region increases with an
increasing level of uncertainty (Volz et al., 2003, 2004), the DMFC
might be necessary for coping with, or resolution of, uncertainty
(Yoshida and Ishii, 2006; Schienle et al., 2010). It is possible that
this function is impaired in individuals with an intolerance of
uncertainty, making them unable to think or act under stressful
conditions (Buhr and Dugas, 2002). A tempting hypothesis is that
the avoidance of interpersonal relationships in some people with
anxiety disorders may, at least in part, arise from an intolerance of
uncertainty associated with inferences about others’ mental states.
A related question is whether individuals with a greater intoler-
ance of uncertainty show atypical brain activation patterns during
performance of ToM tasks.
It has been proposed that the neuromodulator noradrenaline
may play a role in processing uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005).
Evidence suggests that pupil size, an indirect measure of nora-
drenaline levels (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005b), increases with
increasing estimation uncertainty (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005;
Preuschoff et al., 2011; Nassar et al., 2012). Importantly, the
MFC—the anterior cingulate area and adjacent frontomedian
wall likely including the pre-SMA—is the major source of inputs
to the locus coeruleus (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005a), where
noradrenaline-containing neurons are abundant. Indeed, uncer-
tainty driven by volatility modulates pre-SMA activity (Behrens
et al., 2007). Another neuromodulator that may play a role in
uncertainty is dopamine. It has been shown that dopamine-
containing neurons in the midbrain signal uncertainty in the
reward prediction (Fiorillo et al., 2003). These dopaminergic neu-
rons preferentially project to the MFC in addition to the striatum
(Williams and Goldman-Rakic, 1998). The precise contribution
of neuromodulators in uncertainty processing and their impact
on the subsequent coping behavior is an interesting topic of future
research.
PERCEPTION OF INTENTION
A classical definition of social psychology is that it is “an attempt
to understand and explain how the thought, feeling, and behavior
of individuals is influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied
presence of other human beings (Allport, 1954).” The influence
of the actual presence of others is indeed potent, but so is the
influence of imagined or implied presence. Allport has pointed
out that social influence can exist even when others are non-
observable. This definition has been influential in psychology, but
one might then want to ask a simple question: what is special
about the definition at all in terms of social aspects of human
cognition? Put in another way, what aspect best captures “social”
cognition? Probably, the answer does not reside in the words
“imagined or implied presence,” as one’s cognition, affect, or
action is also influenced by the imagined or implied presence of
non-social things such as money. Instead, the answer appears to
reside in the very last word “beings.” Allport’s definition implicitly
asks neuroscientists why people perceive a certain physical entity
as a social being on one hand while viewing another entity as a
non-social thing on the other. Once people “see” the mental states
such as intentions in an entity, it becomes perceived as a social
being and affects the way in which people think, feel, and behave.
We argue that the perception of intentions in others plays a fun-
damental role in social cognition. The DMFC has been implicated
in attention to and perception of such intentions.
Developmental studies suggest that the brain is equipped with
mechanisms that make people perceive intentionality and allow
for a distinction between social beings and non-social things.
Infants as young as 5–8 weeks can exhibit imitative behavior in
response to a person’s movement at significant levels but not to
the movement of artificial devices (Legerstee, 1991). Eighteen-
month-old children can infer intentions from movement when it
is performed by persons but not by inanimate objects (Meltzoff,
1995). They also have the ability to distinguish between inten-
tional and accidental actions performed by others (Olineck and
Poulin-Dubois, 2005). Distinguishing intentional actions from
accidental actions may also be observed in non-human primates
(Call and Tomasello, 1998). The sensitivity to intention in oth-
ers may form the basis of human traits that people often view
others’ actions as caused by those others’ internal dispositions
(Pronin, 2008) and tend to view social agents’ choices as inde-
terministic as opposed to viewing non-social physical events as
deterministic (Nichols, 2004). Of interest is that the ability of
1-year-old infants to attend to others’ intentional actions can pre-
dict the development of ToM at a preschool age (Wellman et al.,
2008). Moreover, the ability of 18-month-old infants to distin-
guish between intentional and accidental actions is related to the
development of internal state language 12 months later (Olineck
and Poulin-Dubois, 2005).
The ability to perceive intentions in others may be intimately
associated with the ability to direct attention to, and become
aware of, one’s own intention. These abilities may have simi-
lar origins in the brain. Accumulating evidence indeed suggests
that at least the DMFC is concerned with both self-intention and
other-intention processes.
The involvement of the DMFC in intention processes was
shown by Fried et al. (1991) in patients receiving electrical stim-
ulation during neurosurgery of intractable epilepsy. They found
that low-intensity stimulation in the SMA could evoke a conscious
urge to move in a specific body part, which was often, but not
always, followed by the actual movement of the same body part at
high currents. A network of the MFC including the SMA, pre-
SMA, and anterior cingulate cortex is strongly activated when
subjects generate intentional actions that are endogenous (Libet
et al., 1983; Ball et al., 1999; Yazawa et al., 2000; Cunnington et al.,
2002; Fried et al., 2011), change intentional action plans (Nachev
et al., 2005), or switch from automatic to intentional actions
(Isoda and Hikosaka, 2007; Hikosaka and Isoda, 2010). Notably,
when participants pay attention to their intention to move, rather
than to their actual movement, there is an increase in activity in
the pre-SMA (Figure 4A), leading the authors to conclude that
pre-SMA activity reflects the representation of intention (Lau
et al., 2004). Consistent with this finding, transient disruption of
the pre-SMA with transcranial magnetic stimulation can reduce
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 232 | 6
Isoda and Noritake Medial frontal cortex and other-mentalizing
FIGURE 4 | Involvement of DMFC in attention to and perception of
intention. (A) Activation of the pre-SMA associated with attention to
intention as compared to attention to movement. The time course of
the hemodynamic response is shown on the right. Reprinted with
permission from Lau et al. (2004). (B) Activation of BA 9 associated
with anticipation of third-person actions as compared to non-biological
agent (i.e., computer) actions. Reprinted with permission from Ramnani
and Miall (2004). ∗P < 0.005. (one-tailed paired t-test).
the temporal binding between intentional actions and their exter-
nal consequences (Moore et al., 2010), which is known as an
implicit measure of the sense of agency (Haggard et al., 2002).
Finally, as mentioned earlier, intention to withhold an endoge-
nously intended action activates the dorsal frontomedian cortex
(BA 9).
The DMFC is also involved in the perception of intentions
in others. An fMRI study showed that attributing the causation
of external events to another person (other-agency) is associated
with activation in the DMFC, including the SMA, caudal cingu-
late zone, and BA 9 (Spengler et al., 2009). Intriguingly, DMFC
activity significantly correlates with individual personality traits
of external action attribution (Spengler et al., 2009). As can be
seen in Figure 4B, anticipating the action of intentional agents,
but not that of computers, leads to the activation of a similar
region in BA 9 (Ramnani and Miall, 2004). A meta-analysis of
fMRI studies points to the converging activation of the pre-SMA
and BA 8 in other-agency (Sperduti et al., 2011). These findings
suggest that the DMFC that processes one’s own intentions also
processes others’ intentions, supporting the view that perception
of one’s own intentions may, at least partly, share similar brain
mechanisms to perception of others’ intentions. As Frith (2002)
has argued, the ToM ability requires the sense of other-agency that
the actions of others are caused by their intentions. Supporting
this view, thementalizing system including the DMFC is recruited
mostly when behavioral tasks describe the human agency or traits
about humans, and much less so when these aspects are absent
(Van Overwalle, 2011). The perception of intentions in others—
be it illusory or not—is the first step in initiating many forms
of interpersonal relationships. In this light, it is of importance to
determine crucial factors whereby an observer perceives a target
as an intentional agent (Johnson et al., 1998).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have reviewed the role played by the DMFC in executive
inhibition, self-other distinction, prediction under uncertainty,
and intention-related processing. The involvement of the DMFC
in these processes may explain why the DMFC is preferentially
activated when people mentalize others’ internal states. We do
not claim, however, that the key processes outlined above are
implemented only by the DMFC. As mentioned earlier, executive
inhibition also recruits the rIFG and subcortical structures (Aron
et al., 2004, 2007). It seems likely that the distinction between
self and others also depends on the computational operation in
regions around the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and superior
temporal sulcus (STS) (Hietanen and Perrett, 1993; David et al.,
2007; Farrer et al., 2008; Sperduti et al., 2011). Prediction under
uncertainty can additionally recruit many regions including the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior and
posterior divisions of cingulate cortex, parietal cortex, lateral sep-
tal regions, pulvinar, and anterior insula (Critchley et al., 2001;
McCoy and Platt, 2005; Tobler et al., 2007; Kepecs et al., 2008;
Platt and Huettel, 2008; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Bossaerts, 2010;
Lamm and Singer, 2010; Stern et al., 2010; Mushtaq et al., 2011;
Grupe and Nitschke, 2013; Komura et al., 2013; Monosov and
Hikosaka, 2013). Finally, intention processing also occurs in the
inferior parietal cortex (Desmurget et al., 2009). These findings
suggest that ToM is a product of global neural networks linking
multiple brain regions (Frith and Frith, 2003; Gallagher and Frith,
2003; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Lombardo et al., 2010b).
Also, it is not the intention of this paper to claim that the
four processes discussed are the only ones that are associated with
ToM. In social life, one needs to attentively monitor the behav-
ior of others, as it provides an important clue to understanding
their mental states. The DMFC is also involved in performance
monitoring in both social and non-social contexts (Ullsperger
and von Cramon, 2001, 2004; Taylor et al., 2007b; de Bruijn
et al., 2009; Yoshida et al., 2012). Other related processes can
include simulation learning (Suzuki et al., 2012), hypothesis test-
ing (Elliott and Dolan, 1998), and perspective-taking (Ruby and
Decety, 2001, 2003) or viewpoint transformation (Wraga et al.,
2005). Each of these processes activates the DMFC. Clarifying
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the cellular mechanisms of such higher-level cognitive processing
has not been possible in non-human primates due to the com-
plexity of tasks that monkeys can perform and, therefore, would
heavily rely on experiments in humans, perhaps using a com-
bined approach of functional imaging, single-neuron recording,
and computational modeling.
The mentalizing ability allows one to infer not only the
intentions of others but also their affective states. Although not
reviewed in the present article, it should be mentioned that the
capacity to share the feelings and emotions of others, referred to
as empathy, contributes to the understanding of other people’s
mental states (Singer, 2006; Melloni et al., 2013). Empathy relies
on limbic and paralimbic divisions of the MFC, including the
anterior cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex, as well as the anterior insula (Singer et al., 2004;
Singer, 2006; Pessoa, 2008; Kennedy and Adolphs, 2012; Melloni
et al., 2013). Notably, Ibanez et al. (2013a,b) have recently demon-
strated that performance of emotional inference of others’ feelings
and thoughts can be predicted by individual differences in execu-
tive function, empathy, and a cortical potential that captures the
processing of emotional stimuli, suggesting a close link between
affective processing, executive function, and ToM. These findings
are also in line with the proposal that emotion and cognition
strongly interact in the brain and jointly contribute to behavior
(Pessoa, 2008). In this regard, an important question for future
research is how—in both behavioral and neural terms—the four
component processes outlined here are influenced by the affective
states of individuals. Future research should also investigate the
mechanisms underlying interdependence between affective and
cognitive processing in the context of ToM. To address these issues
and understand the cellular basis of empathy, it would be useful to
establish reliable markers that capture different types of emotion
in non-human primates. The measurement of facial expressions
combined with autonomic nervous system indexes may allow for
the identification and classification of emotional states.
Social cognition, includingmentalizing, is thought to bemedi-
ated by a specific set of neural circuits, often referred to as
the “social brain.” Thus, an additional consideration in under-
standing ToM concerns how the DMFC interacts with other
regions in large-scale networks. Such network perspectives are
now being widely applied to the study of neurological and psy-
chiatric disorders as well, representing a shift in emphasis from
specific brain regions to specific brain networks (Menon, 2011;
Castellanos and Proal, 2012; Ibanez and Manes, 2012; Kennedy
and Adolphs, 2012; McCairn et al., 2013). The fact that some
reports show only partial or no affection of ToM due to damage
in the MFC (Bird et al., 2004; Baird et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007) also pro-
motes network-level considerations. Importantly, the MFC of
humans and monkeys, including areas associated with mental-
izing, has functional organization that shares similar patterns of
coupling between each MFC subregion and the rest of the brain
(Sallet et al., 2013). There is also evidence that a specific neu-
ral network covaries with the complexity of social networks in
both humans and monkeys (Bickart et al., 2011; Sallet et al., 2011;
Lewis et al., 2011; Kanai et al., 2012; Rushworth et al., 2013). For
example, the middle part of the monkey STS has a connectivity
profile that is most similar to the human TPJ (Mars et al., 2013),
another crucial area in the mentalizing network. The gray matter
density in the mid-STS, and that is in areas 9 and 10, increases as
the complexity of macaques’ social environments increase (Sallet
et al., 2011). Such a temporofrontal coupling also exists even
at rest, constituting the “dorsal medial prefrontal cortex subsys-
tem” of the default mode network (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010).
Furthermore, the DMFC is increasingly recruited in the default
mode network as the social complexity increases (Mars et al.,
2012). These findings may suggest that the STS and the DMFC are
integrative “hubs” in large-scale social brain networks for predict-
ing others’ intentions and behavior. Activity in these hubs, and
interactions between them, may be occurring more frequently
when animals are in larger social groups, because they have to
make and adjust more predictions about what othermembers will
do in a given context. This conjecture is supported by activity in
DMFC that reflects expectations about what another agent will do
and errors in such predictions (van Schie et al., 2004; Suzuki et al.,
2012; Yoshida et al., 2012) and is also in line with the proposal
that the frontotemporal network plays a key role in context-driven
predictions (Bar, 2004, 2009; Barrett and Bar, 2009) particularly
under social situations (Ibanez and Manes, 2012). It should be
emphasized that social cognition processes, including the predic-
tion of others’ intention and behavior, are embedded in specific
contextual circumstances.
The monkey STS contains many neurons that are selective
for the direction of the face (or head), eye gaze, and body of
another agent rather than for its identity (Perrett et al., 1985,
1992; Wachsmuth et al., 1994; De Souza et al., 2005), suggest-
ing that this cortical area is important in determining where the
target agent is attending. Moreover, parts of the STS contain neu-
rons that are sensitive to other sources of social information,
such as motion of others’ body parts (Hietanen and Perrett, 1993;
Oram and Perrett, 1994). Furthermore, the activity of those neu-
rons is likely to be modulated by the intentionality of another’s
actions (Jellema et al., 2000). Thus, the monkey STS, identified as
most similar to human TPJ, may be involved in detecting whether
the target is animate or not and understanding what the target’s
intention is, at least in a rudimentary form. Such signals may then
be conveyed to the DMFC (Seltzer and Pandya, 1989; Luppino
et al., 2001), where the information is integrated with contextual
information, predictions are made about what the agent is going
to do, and appropriate behavior is organized to meet a contextual
need as well as one’s own goal. Perhaps, during social interactions,
the four processes are simultaneously engaged in the network
to predict others’ intention. The challenge for future research is
to determine the biological underpinnings and computational
formulations of such concurrent network operations.
It appears that the region activated in mentalizing tasks is
often more anterior, albeit with some overlap, than the regions
typically activated in some of the component processes outlined
in the present article, such as executive inhibition, prediction
under uncertainty, and attention to or perception of intention.
Whereas such a regional differentiation may suggest that the
anterior DMFC plays a role in integrating different component
processes to support the appropriate mentalizing operation in a
task at hand, it may also support the existence of another function
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that is crucial for recruiting the more anterior part. One plausible
hypothesis is that the degree of recursive inferences or simulations
involved in mentalizing determines the degree of activity in this
region. Adaptive success in social life, in particular when com-
peting against an intelligent adversary, requires iterated steps of
reasoning about each other’s mental states, for example, “what
you think the others think about what you think.” It is such a
process of higher-order recursions that preferentially recruits the
anterior DMFC (BA 10) (Hampton et al., 2008; Coricelli and
Nagel, 2009). Another hypothesis that could account for the func-
tional gradient between the more caudal vs. rostral DMFC is that
the former is associated with a general role in perceiving inten-
tions in others and the latter plays a specific role in inferring the
content of others’ intentions. This intriguing hypothesis is testable
using neuroimaging techniques with human subjects.
People do not mentalize an object such as a car or computer
as long as they do not assume the mental states in it. It is the
subjective perception of a mind in the target that triggers mental-
izing and social interactions. The condition in which the DMFC
becomes active is not confined to inferences about other human
beings, but can also include those about non-human animals
(e.g., dogs) (Mitchell et al., 2005), which are generally believed
to have mental states. Notably, even early infants have biological
mechanisms that make them sensitive to animacy and intention-
ality. Perceiving the mental states such as intentions in others
makes the world around us social and therefore underlies virtu-
ally all kinds of social interactions. Neuroscientists are given the
great opportunity to challenge the following profound questions:
“What neural mechanisms make observers interpret that a cer-
tain physical entity has a mind?” and “what neural mechanisms
underlie the perception of intentionality in others’ actions?” Of
course, these questions are inevitably related to the problem of
free will.
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